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‘All happy families are alike; 
 but each unhappy family has its own unique reasons for its misery.’ 
Leon Tolstoy 
Anna Karenina 
 
‘One must work to fuse the pessimism of intelligence and the optimism of the will.’ 
Antonio Gramsci 
 
Introduction 
The heavy investments of important Spanish companies in Latin America in recent 
years have significantly increased Spain’s concern with the region’s macroeconomic 
developments. Unfortunately, most analyses of the region’s complex social and 
economic realities have unrealistically attempted to offer a brief yet conclusive 
evaluation of Latin America in its entirety, feeding one or another preconceived 
generalization, depending on the political agenda of the author in question. Indeed, 
either ‘Latin America is the region of the future’ or it is a place that will continue to be 
so for a long time to come. 
 
The significant deterioration in the international economic environment since 1997, 
along with the negative consequences of the Asian and Russian financial crises, 
particularly for other emerging market economies, have certainly not served to clarify 
the debate. Growing risk aversion among investors – and its most concrete expression, a 
drop in net capital inflows – has revealed political, social and economic ‘vulnerabilities’ 
we had believed to be resolved some time ago. Gradually, but steadily, the balance of 
risks within the region began to tip, first toward caution and then in the direction of an 
overt pessimism. Academics and politicians who had previously invested their 
intellectual capital defending ‘the Latin American model of liberalizing and opening 
reforms’ began to claim, very Spanish-like, that ‘no, that was not it’. 
 
As one might expect in such a Calvinist discipline like economic analysis, the reason 
behind this change in perception as to the nature of the region’s predicament can 
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explained by what has come to be known as Latin America’s ‘original sin’ 1: the 
excessive level of de facto dollarization in the region’s financial liabilities. Soon, a long 
list of weaknesses were dragged into the debate: a litany of economic vulnerabilities 
constituting a virtual catechism of the region’s deadly sins. 
 
Latin America’s Seven Deadly Sins 
I. Quality o  Democrati  Institution  and Political Governance. f c s
                                                
II. Corruption. 
III. Inequality in the Distribution of Income and Wealth. 
IV. Low Rates of Domestic Savings. 
• Low Rates of Private Sector Savings in Local Currency. 
• Public Sector Dissavings and Risk of Default on Public Debt. 
V. Dependence on Foreign Savings and Insignificant Exposure to International 
Trade. 
• High level of external debt. 
• Significant net transfers of resources abroad. 
• Insignificant weight of exports in final demand. 
• Need for intense adjustments in the trade balance as a result of ‘sudden 
stops’ in the inflow of capital. 
• Exchange rate volatility. 
VI. Low Rates of Investment in Physical and Human Capital. 
VII. Low Levels of Medium- and Long-Term Finance in Local Currencies. 
• Public sector debt financing “crowds out” private sector investment. 
• Underdeveloped capital markets. 
• De facto dollarization of financial liabilities. 
 
This chapter attempts to quantify the true significance of these supposed ‘sins’ for each 
of the seven principal Latin American economies2 and provide a regional evaluation of 
the severity of such vulnerabilities. The final section illustrates the apparent connection 
between these ‘weaknesses’ and economic experience, both in terms of growth and 
macroeconomic instability. 
 
The most compelling conclusion is that Latin America is not in any way an 
economically homogenous geographic area. The region has witnessed structural 
changes which challenge the historical pessimism implicit in the oft-heard contention 
that ‘Latin America has always been and always will be like this,’ an excuse offered by 
those emulating the Zavalito of ‘Conversations in the Cathedral’ in their efforts to 
account for the ‘Latin American curse’ which seemingly condemns the region to 
political, economic and social failure. 
 
But beyond the pessimism expressed in this general and oversimplified view of the 
region, one uncovers the details of national histories from which emerge the images of a 
continent where both ‘histories of success’ and ‘histories of decline’ have always 
coexisted. While it is true that the majority of the region’s countries share the 
‘weaknesses’ contained in our list of deadly sins, each country – as Tolstoy reminds us 
– is unhappy in its own way and for its own reasons. And this has been so across 
 
1 Ricardo Haussman, (2002). 
2 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
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historical periods and all the various political and economic models that have developed 
during the last three decades, only to be later discarded. 
 
The immediate implications of all of this are clear: in Latin America – as in any other 
part of the world – one can be optimistic, so long as one learns to blend the pessimism 
of the intellect with the optimism of the will. Or, as the jesuit Baltasar Gracián (1601-
1658) might have said, when the reforms needed by a region are finally undertaken, 
‘...pursuing the easy things as though they were difficult, and the difficult things as 
though they were easy; because in this way we avoid, on the one hand, the failure that 
comes from overconfidence and, on the other, the failure that comes from a lack of 
faith.’ 
 
The Myth of a Cursed Continent 
Table 1 presents the average economic growth rates of a representative group of Latin 
American economies between 1960 and 2003. 3 From this table we can arrive at two 
conclusions: 
 
(a) Brazil, Mexico and Chile have grown at an average annual rate of more than 
4% during the last 40 years. To place this into a relevant context, one could 
point to another success story, Spain, which grew at exactly the same rate 
and with a similar level of volatility during this period.4 
(b) All of these economies grew more between 1960 and 1973 than after the 
formal breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the oil shock. Brazil 
and Mexico, in particular, grew between 1960 and 1973 at a growth rate 
double that experienced in 1973-2003. 
 
Table 1.  Average GDP Growth 
Growth 1960-2003 Ave 1960-1973 Ave 1973-03 Ave 1990s Ave 1997-2003 Ave 
Brazil 5.0 8.5 3.8 2.3 1.3 
Mexico 4.6 7.1 3.7 3.5 3.8 
Chile 4.0 3.5 4.0 6.4 3.0 
Colombia 3.9 4.9 3.6 2.7 0.9 
Peru 3.3 5.6 2.3 4.1 2.4 
Venezuela 2.8 5.5 2.4 2.1 -1.7 
Argentina 2.3 5.1 1.6 4.2 -1.1 
Uruguay 1.9 1.3 2.3 3.1 -0.1 
      
Latin America 4.2 6.7 3.4 3.2 1.6 
      
Spain 4.0 6.8 2.7 2.5 3.3 
      
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database. April 2002,2003.   
 
Although it is true that since 1973 the region as a whole has grown at rates below the 
average for the emerging market economies of Asia – some 2.5 percentage points below 
                                                 
3 The average growth of the Latin American-7 is obtained by using the fixed weightings derived from the 
weight each economy had within the regional GDP during 2002. 
4 The standard deviation of Spanish economic growth has been 2.8, while the weighted average of Latin 
America has been 2.9, even though the lack of synchronicity between the economic cycles of each of the 
region’s economies makes the regional average much less volatile than that of the individual economies. 
In fact, only one country – Colombia – had a growth volatility lower than that of Spain between 1960 and 
2003.  
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– countries like Brazil, Mexico and Chile have registered growth rates above the world 
average and certainly above those experienced in the developed world. During the 
1990s, Chile rose to a very competitive position within world growth tables – behind 
only China, Singapore and Malaysia – while Mexico matched the world average. All of 
this suggests that there is no such thing as a ‘Latin American curse.’ The region’s 
economies include ‘success stories’ as well as others which are less impressive. On the 
whole, however, Latin America has not been left behind in any significant way during 
the last long phase of world growth. 
 
The search for growth is the leading motive behind the decisions of investors when 
justifying their strategic direct investments and international acquisitions, while the 
primary preoccupation of analysts evaluating the prospects of investment companies is 
the economy’s volatility. Graph 1 presents the map of growth and risk which has 
characterised the region since 1973 and suggests an uncomfortable conclusion: over the 
middle run, and viewed exclusively through the prism of growth, the countries with the 
lowest volatilities have not been those which have grown the most. 
 
 
 Graph I. Growth and Volatility  
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One possible explanation for this apparent paradox could be that none of the economies 
of the region has yet reached the critical mass of stability necessary for reaping the 
benefits normally associated with a higher level of predictability in macroeconomic 
variables. Alternatively, one might argue that the kind of ‘volatility’ that really matters 
is that associated with macroeconomic variables other than the growth of GDP – for 
example, the real exchange rate, real interest rates, or inflation – or even that ‘stability’ 
is too recent an achievement to be already yielding significant benefits in terms of the 
mid-term potential growth rate. 
 
A broader interpretation might argue that the costs of the volatile growth pattern 
experienced by many of the region’s economies have tended to reflect themselves not in 
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GDP growth rates but rather in other social and economic variables (like income 
distribution patterns, depth and maturity of national financial systems, or a capacity to 
attract foreign investment) which might exert an appreciable influence over future 
potential growth rates. This is to a large extent the interpretation implicitly favoured by 
the region’s economic authorities when they betray their preference for ‘sustainable 
economic growth’ capable of reducing poverty levels in a sustained fashion and 
allowing for the creation of a middle class. 
 
The many good intentions of the region’s politicians, according to some observers, still 
collide with a reality which has until now been impossible to change: a range of 
structural weaknesses – the region’s so-called ‘deadly sins’ -- which continue drag the 
economy down. Nevertheless, despite the importance these ‘sins’ are afforded, there 
have been almost no attempts to quantify, more or less objectively, the extent of their 
ultimate reach. Even more infrequent have been attempts to verify whether or not these 
‘weaknesses’ have grown over time. Rarer still have been those studies measuring the 
impact of these ‘deadly sins’ within the growth context of each of the region’s 
economies. 
 
There are no doubt good reasons for this, but until we can identify with relative 
precision what is actually preventing these economies from growing at their potential 
growth rates, government agendas are likely to be oriented toward objectives which are 
not true priorities. 5 If this remains the case, it is nearly certain that the interpretation of 
the region’s economic realities will continue to respond more to myth than to reason.  
 
Institutional Weakness and Corruption 
Consensus – some might also say history – identifies corruption and weaknesses in 
democratic institutions as the first deadly sin of the region. Considering the tumultuous 
political history of most of these countries, the tenuous separation and independence of 
democratic powers which frequently characterize the region’s democracies, and the 
apparent thinness of region’s civil society, one is nearly obliged to immediately concede 
the argument. 
 
However, quantifying ‘institutional weakness’ and determining whether this has 
improved and deteriorated in recent years is an altogether more complex affair. To 
elaborate an objective index which expresses the quality of institutions is certainly not 
an easy task, and much less so is the attempt to make international and inter-temporal 
comparisons. Nevertheless, in recent years this type of indicator has proliferated6 and 
begun to be employed in certain academic studies.7
                                                 
5 First, there is a serious ‘measurement’ problem, particularly with respect to the institutional ‘deadly 
sins.’ Second, there is another no less serious problem with regard to ‘causality’:  in many cases there are 
good reasons for thinking that the relationship between the ‘sin’ and the impact on growth is mutually 
reinforcing, or bi-directional.  
6 Kaufmann, et. Al. (2002), Transparency International (2002), World Competitiveness Report, Index of 
Economic Freedom (2002). Since 1975 the Fraser Institute has published the ‘Index of World Economic 
Freedom,’ in which appears two sections which could be associated with ‘institutional quality’: ‘size of 
State’ and ‘legal structure and protection of property rights.’ In the latter category are included indicators 
expressing the independence of the Judiciary, the impartiality of the courts, the defence of intellectual 
property rights, the participation of the military within the Executive branch, and the integrity of the legal 
system.  For this section, Latin America receives its worst rating of any section of the index: 4.2 against a 
world average of 5.5 and 9.0 for the US.  In inter-temporal terms the situation has gotten worse with the 
passage of time: Latin America’s rating for 2002 is 33% below that of 1990 while the world average has 
actually risen 4%. The differences between countries in the region is quite marked: Chile (6.2), Uruguay 
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The Index of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton is probably one of the most widely 
used indices of this type and one with the most widely accepted methodology.8 Table 2 
presents the data from the latest edition of the Kaufmann index for selected countries. 
The first conclusion that stands out is that Latin America as a region has a worse rating 
than that which would be derived from the sum of the individual country ratings, an 
observation that might feed the suspicion that there indeed exists a ‘Latin American 
curse,’ or at least a negative externality.9 In any case, the clearest result presented in 
Table 2 is the high level of dispersion among the national indices: while Chile is 
perceived to be an economy which ‘institutionally’ is similar to Spain – indeed, Chile 
occupies a position only three spots below that of Spain in the overall international 
ranking – Venezuela is clearly within the second decile of countries with the worst 
levels of governance, on par with Kenya, Bielorussia, and Georgia. 
 
Table 2. Quality of Institutions and Governance (Part I)  
       
 Synthetic  Representation  Stability
 Level Ranking  Level Ranking  Level Ranking 
Venezuela, RB 25.3 40 Peru 27.9 49 Colombia 9.1 15 
Colombia 33.8 54 Colombia 47.7 85 Peru 27.9 45 
Latin America 37.2 61 Mexico 48.3 86 Mexico 35.1 56 
Mexico 47.4 78 Latin America 56.2 101 Latin America 36.4 59 
Argentina 48.1 79 Venezuela. RB 61.0 110 Brazil 38.3 62 
Peru 52.6 86 Argentina 66.3 119 Venezuela, RB 40.3 65 
Brazil 64.3 104 Brazil 67.4 121 Uruguay 63.0 102 
Uruguay 71.4 115 Chile 69.2 124 Chile 67.5 109 
Chile 84.4 135 Uruguay 73.8 132 Argentina 69.5 112 
         
Simple Average 51.6   57.5   43.0  
Weighted Average 53.3   58.1   40.0  
Standard Deviation 19.0   14.4   20.0  
         
Pro_Memoria         
Spain 85.7 138 Spain 87.8 157 Spain 72.1 116 
US 89.0 143 US 95.9 171 US 85.7 138 
Denmark 100.0 160 Switzerland 100.0 178 Switzerland 100.0 160 
Source: Based on data from Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-
Lobaton ( 2002).     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(5.8) and Brasil (4.9) are far above Venezuela (1.9), the region’s worst country in this category according 
to the  Fraser Institute. 
7 IMF Working Paper WP/03/12, Is Transparency Good For you, and Can the IMF Help?  
8 The Index incorporates five groups of variables – ‘representation and accountability,’ ‘political stability 
and violence,’ ‘efficiency of government,’ ‘regulatory burden,’ and ‘rule of law’ – and is compiled for 
170 countries and geographic areas. The values in the series range between 0 and 100, and higher index 
levels indicate better levels of governance. The most recent update of the index dates from 2002 although 
we have not found historical series which would allow for inter-temporal comparisons. 
9 Against a maximum of 100, the index gives the region a rating of 37, although when the individual 
national ratings are weighted according to each one’s relative GDP weighting within the region, the 
regional rating becomes 53. This difference implies a negative Latin American bias of some 30%. 
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Table 2. Quality of Institutions and Governance (Part I) 
       
 
Govern. 
Efficacy  Regulation  Rule of Law
 Level Ranking  Level Ranking  Level Ranking 
Venezuela, 
RB 14.8 24 Venezuela, RB 44.8 78 Colombia 22.4 38 
Latin America 37.3 61 Brazil 47.3 82 Venezuela, RB 29.1 49 
Brazil 47.1 78 Latin America 55.4 96 Peru 33.3 57 
Colombia 52.9 87 Colombia 58.8 102 Mexico 35.2 60 
Peru 65.8 107 Mexico 75.2 129 Latin America 37.9 65 
Mexico 67.1 109 Argentina 77.6 133 Brazil 47.3 82 
Argentina 69.7 113 Peru 78.2 134 Uruguay 63.6 110 
Uruguay 76.8 124 Chile 89.7 154 Argentina 64.8 112 
Chile 85.8 139 Uruguay 92.7 159 Chile 86.1 148 
         
 57.5   68.9   46.6  
 56.2   62.6   44.5  
 21.9   17.8   20.8  
         
         
US 90.3 146 Spain 85.5 147 Spain 83.6 143 
Spain 94.2 152 US 95.2 163 US 87.9 151 
Singapore 100.0 161 Singapore 100.0 171 Switzerland 100.0 171 
Source: Based on data from Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-
Lobaton ( 2002).        
 
 
The Kaufmann Governance Index underlines two other relevant developments. On the 
one hand, the liberalization and deregulation of the past decade have brought the region 
closer to the standards of developed countries – the region’s average is highest for this 
indicator – while there does exist a well-developed and vibrant freedom of expression, 
despite the peculiarities of the region’s civil and political systems, and a reasonable 
expectation that political power is accountable for its behaviour. On the other hand, the 
partial indicators which marginalize Latin America from the governance ideal are, first, 
political instability and violence (the indicator on which the region performs the 
poorest) and, second, regulatory risks which stem from weak rule of law. 
 
In general, these results fit well with the typical preconceptions with respect to the 
quality of the region’s ‘politics and governance.’ It is nevertheless difficult to extract 
from these results any normative prescription that might be effectively incorporated into 
an ‘agenda for growth.’ On the one hand, this is due to the weakness of the correlation 
between ‘governance’ and growth, as can be seen in a simple comparison of Tables 1 
and 2. Furthermore, the two indicators with the most room for improvement are, by 
definition, long-term. The memory of past institutional instability continues to exert 
negative impact on the value of the index for a long time. In a similar fashion, the rule 
of law is subject to similar dynamics affecting the reputation of an individual: one 
spends a lifetime creating it while it takes only one bad moment to lose it. The best 
evidence of this is the privileged place in Table 2’s classifications which Argentina still 
occupied in 2002. 
 
The publication of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since 
1996 nevertheless allows us a certain dose of optimism with respect to the capacity of 
Latin American countries to improve the perception of their vulnerable societies. Table 
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3 presents the Index’s historical data pointing to the least corrupt country in each year. 10 
As one can see by comparing the index value in 2002 with the average for the period 
1997-2000, there is only one country (Peru) that has lost ground in relative terms, and 
another (Argentina) which has not advanced. The rest of the region’s countries have 
seen their perceived levels of corruption decline with time. In certain cases – Colombia 
is the most notable – this decline has been significant. 
 
Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index 
 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 Average
 Level 
% 2002-
2000 
% 1999-
1998      2002-2000 1999-1997
                      
Argentina 29% 68% 100% 37% 36% 30% 30% 28% 54% 29% 
Brazil 42% 70% 108% 42% 40% 41% 40% 36% 60% 39% 
Chile 79% 89% 120% 79% 76% 69% 68% 61% 88% 66% 
Colombia 38% 61% 155% 40% 33% 29% 22% 22% 65% 24% 
Mexico 38% 66% 121% 39% 34% 34% 33% 27% 59% 31% 
Peru 42% 73% 94% 43% 45% 45% 45% 45% 59% 45% 
Uruguay 54% 75% 125% 54% 49% 44% 43% 42% 71% 43% 
Venezuela 26% 60% 103% 29% 28% 26% 23% 28% 49% 26% 
           
Spain 75% 86% 120% 74% 71% 66% 61% 59% 85% 62% 
USA 81% 91% 107% 80% 80% 75% 75% 77% 88% 76% 
Denmark 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index. http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~uwvw/index.php?datei=cpi_olderindices 
 
When the absolute level of perceived corruption is analyzed, the regional differences are 
quite pronounced: while Chile appears as a ‘first world’ country – its ranking is higher 
than that of Spain – Venezuela and Argentina are a long way from being perceived as 
honest societies. In fact, Argentina occupies the same level as the Ivory Coast and 
Uzbekistan, while only 15 countries have rankings, according to the index, worse than 
that of Venezuela. 
 
The conclusion we get from this first glance at the quantitative indicators on Latin 
America’s first deadly sin is clear: it does not make much sense to speak of the 
institutional weakness of ‘Latin America’ since the differences between the countries of 
the region are simple breathtaking on a number of these indicators. On the other hand, 
when one attempts to relate ‘institutional quality’ with ‘growth,’ the argument that 
superior institutions pays dividends in terms of faster growth holds only for the 
exceptional case of Chile, while it is undermined by the disappointing macroeconomic 
performance of Uruguay. We will return to this issue in the last section of the chapter. 
 
Income Distribution and Poverty 
The region’s second deadly sin is its highly unequal distribution of wealth and income. 
Whatever indicator is used, Latin America comes out much less egalitarian than any 
other region of the world. Table 4 presents the data on income distribution found in the 
World Bank’s annual Social Indicators publication. Both the Gini Index and the simple 
relationship between the income of the top 10% of the population and that of the poorest 
                                                 
10 The privileged top spot has always been occupied by a Nordic country, like Finland or Denmark, with 
the exception of 1997 when the least corrupt country was perceived to be New Zealand. 
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10% show Brazil as the most unequal country in the region, followed by Colombia, 
Chile and Mexico. The most egalitarian economies include Uruguay and Argentina (at 
least before the tragedy of 2002). 
 
Table 4. Income Distribution  
    Ginni   % Income Received by Each Decile 
Ratio 
10% 
  Index 
Poorest 
10% 20% 30-40% 50-60% 70-80% 80-100% 
Richest 
10% Extreme 
           
Argentina  49 2 5 8 16 23 48 35 18 
Brazil  60 0.9 2.5 5.5 10 18.3 63.8 47.6 53 
Chile  56.5 1.4 3.5 6.6 10.9 18.1 61 46.1 33 
Colombia  57.1 1.1 3 6.6 11.1 18.4 60.9 46.1 42 
Mexico  53.7 1.4 3.6 7.2 11.8 19.2 58.2 42.8 31 
Peru  46.2 1.6 4.4 9.1 14.1 21.3 51.2 35.4 22 
Uruguay  42.3 2.1 5.4 10 14.8 21.5 48.3 32.7 16A  
Venezuela  48.8 1.3 3.7 8.4 13.6 21.2 53.1 37 28 
           
Simple Average 51,7 1.5 3.9 7.7 12.8 20.1 55.6 40.3 27 
Weighted Average 54,5 1.3 3.3 6.7 11.6 19.2 58.1 42.9 34 
Years in which the Survey was 
undertaken        
Argentina Brasil Chile 
Colom
bia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela    
E 1996 1994 1996 1995 1996 1989 1996    
Source: World Bank, World Economic Report 2000-2001. 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/tab4.pdf  
 
A quick reading of these numbers might lead one to the conclusion that the most 
unequal countries are precisely those which have grown the most. However, the most 
reasonable observation would be that the clearest priority of Latin American countries 
has been to increase the growth rate rather than to improve income distribution. 
Furthermore, one could also claim that the high level of volatility and the weakness of 
active income redistribution programs have combined to produce a result which ex-ante 
would have been difficult to identify as a distinct target of economic policy. Given this 
problem’s economic, political and moral significance, any alternative hypothesis would 
require much more significant research than feasible within the scope of this current 
chapter. 
 
Another similar, if distinct, regional characteristic concerns the evolution of poverty. 
The ‘Battle Against Poverty’ – particularly extreme poverty – has often been the 
centrepiece of economic policy statements by Latin American and has systemically 
figured in the recent proliferation of criticisms of the ‘neoliberal’ model. The ECLAC 
figures presented in Table 5 help situate the problem with a minimum of rigour. 11 Here 
we see that the tendency has been for poverty – particularly indigence, or extreme 
poverty – to fall sharply during most of the 1990s as economies stabilized and absorbed 
the dramatic social consequences of the hyperinflation of the ‘Lost Decade’ of the 
1980s. Nevertheless, the slowdown in economic growth beginning in 1998 partially 
reversed the achievements of the years of reform in this regard. Obviously, the 
                                                 
11 Data is not available for all countries or for all years. We have chosen to rely on the ECLAC data 
which most closely reflects the title of the table and to use social indicators from the World Bank as 
substitutes in cases where ECLAC figures are not available. Data for 1998 and 2001 are ECLAC 
estimates based on national household surveys. 
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Argentine case – not yet fully incorporated into the picture revealed in Table 5, as its 
data comes from 2001 – has exercised a significant impact on this result: when 
Argentine is excluded from the regional figures, between 1998 and 2001, the percentage 
of households both below the poverty line and below the indigence threshold continued 
to decline (3% and 2%, respectively). 
 
Table 5. Percentage of the Population Below the Poverty Line and Indigence Threshold 
2001 1998 Circa 1990 % 2001 vs. 1998
% 1998 vs. Circa 
1990
Country Poverty Indigence Poverty Indigence Poverty Indigence Poverty Indigence Poverty Indigence
           
Argentina 30.3 10.2 19.7 4.8 12.3 2.1 53.8% 113% 60% 129% 
Brazil 36.9 13 37.5 12.9 41.4 18.3 -1.6% 1% -9% -30% 
Chile 20 5.4 21.7 5.6 33.3 10.6 -7.8% -4% -35% -47% 
Colombia 54.9 27.6 54.9 26.8 50.5 22.6 0.0% 3% 9% 19% 
Mexico 42.3 16.4 46.9 18.5 39.3 14 -9.8% -11% 19% 32% 
Peru 49 23.2 48.6 22.4 53.5 22.4 0.8% 4% -9% 0% 
Uruguay 11.4 2.4 9.4 1.8 11.8 2 21.3% 33% -20% -10% 
Venezuela 48.5 21.2 44 19.4 34.2 11.8 10.2% 9% 29% 64% 
           
Latam 
Weighted 40.3 15.0 40.4 14.7 37.1 14.6 -0.4% 2% 9% 0% 
Latam ex - 
Argentina 35.2 13.9 36.4 14.2 35.8 14.4 -3.2% -2% 2% -2% 
           
Millions of 
Persons 146.3 53.2 138.2 50.3 144.6 62.4 5.9% 6% -4% -19% 
           
Source: ECLAC, 2003. 
http://www.eclac.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/8/11258/cuadrospanosoc1.pdf     
                                          
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/DesarrolloSocial/8/LCG2138PI/PSI2001_annex.pdf    
World Bank, 2001-2002.  http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/tab4.pdf  
 
Although the poverty levels revealed in Table 5 remain high, the most telling 
conclusion coming from the data is the strong relationship established between 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Two (Brazil and Chile) of the three countries 
which have had the greatest success in fighting poverty are among the three economies 
of the region which have experienced the strongest economic growth during the last 25 
years. Brazil has managed to reduce the percentage of households living below the 
poverty line by 11% and the percentage of households living in indigence by 29%, 
while the progress in Chile has been even more dramatic (reductions of 40% and 49%, 
respectively). On the other hand, the three countries which have grown the least – 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela – are those where both poverty and indigence have 
expanded most rapidly. The idea that growth is a pre-requisite for poverty reduction has 
therefore been given solid statistical backing.  
 
Combining income distribution patters with the evolution of per capita incomes 
produces a very clear picture of one of the most salient economic features of the region 
– the marked and universally recognized contrast in levels of living standards – but 
from which only rarely is the logical conclusion drawn: the existence of a significant 
number of consumers enjoying a level of purchasing power not dissimilar to that found 
in the most advanced economies and which now represents a respectable percentage of 
the total population.  
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Using the data presented in the above tables allows us to conclude – if only tentatively – 
that Brazil has more than 70 million consumers with a purchasing power (when adjusted 
for relative price levels, ie using the PPP method) above $US 5,000 a year and, of these, 
34 million have a per capita income (adjusted for PPP) of around $US 21,000 a year, 
some 3% higher than the average Spanish consumer. The equivalent estimate for 
Mexico would put some 60 million consumers at a PPP-adjusting purchasing power of 
more than $US 5,000 of which 20 million possess a PPP-adjusted per capita income of 
around $US 26,500 (or 29% higher than the average Spanish consumer). Expressed in 
different terms, if the level of Spanish per capita consumption is taken to mark the 
threshold of the middle class, Mexico then has a middle class twice as large as that of 
Spain, while the Brazilian middle class is some 1.25 times larger than its Spanish 
equivalent. Looking at the phenomenon in these terms leaves us with little doubt as to 
why Mexico and Brazil have become primary direct foreign investment destinations for 
those searching for ‘growth’ opportunities.  
 
Domestic Savings Rates 
The region’s first deadly macroeconomic sin is found in its low domestic savings rates. 
The typical description of the region has been one in which the private sector saves 
little, and usually abroad, while the public sector dissaves much, going excessively into 
debt and therefore creating a situation in which the region is often forced to default. 
 
If this was ever an accurate characterisation of the region, today it no longer is. The 
average private sector savings rate in Latin America during the 1990s was 21.3%, with 
countries like Brazil registering a healthy 26.3% in 2003, Chile 21.1% of GDP and 
Mexico a rate of 23.3%. All of these countries are producing private savings rates that 
are higher than that of the Spanish private sector , to say nothing of the US private 
sector – a mere 14.6% of GDP – or the even lower savings rate of US households (4%). 
 
The most relevant sign of the structural change occurring in recent years among Latin 
America’s principal economies is not so much the increase in the region’s private 
savings rates, but rather how and where these economies are saving. 12  Table 6 presents 
Latin America’s financial savings map, comparing it to that of Spain. The first 
conclusion one can draw from it – and no doubt a surprising one for any analyst that had 
not previously internalised the cliché that Latin America saves very little – is that the 
entire Latin American savings market is smaller than that of Spain, perhaps the single 
most important symptom of the financial wounds the region has been nursing from its 
discouraging macroeconomic past.13
 
Table 6. Map of Latin American Financial Savings 
2002 (US$bn) 
 Deposits Invest. Funds Pension Funds Total
 US $ % Region US $ % Region  % Region US $ % Region % GDP 
          
Argentina 20 6% 8 5% 11 12% 39 7% 36% 
Brazil 121 35% 100 62%   221 37% 59% 
                                                 
12 Although there are no generalised public releases of consolidated financial wealth in the region, one 
can analyse private savings behaviour by analysing the data provided by each country’s regulatory 
authorities on their banking systems, and investment and pensions funds. 
13 Although, while the volume of deposits in the Latin American financial system is only 58% of the 
Spanish market, when investment and pension funds are included, it is some 75% of the Spanish market. 
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Chile 36 10% 7 4% 35 40% 78 13% 122% 
Colombia 11 3% 8 5% 7 8% 25 4% 26% 
Mexico 125 37% 31 19% 31 35% 187 32% 32% 
Peru 12 3% 3 2% 4 5% 19 3% 33% 
Uruguay 6 2%   1 1% 7 1% 81% 
Venezuela 12 3% 4 3%   16 3% 16% 
          
Latin America 343 100% 161 100% 88 100% 591 100% 40% 
Spain 593  162  52  807  116% 
% Spain 58%  99%  170%  73%   
Source: International Financial Statistics IMF, regulatory bodies and the Bank of Spain 
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Brazil, México and Chile again lead the pack in all possible categories. Together they 
account for 82% of the region’s financial savings and 75% of the long-term savings 
managed by the pension funds. Although it is clear that all countries in the region have 
room to improve – see Graph 2 – the increasing use of the banking system is a structural 
change which has been underway for some time now in most of the region’s economies. 
14 This development has an obvious macroeconomic origin – the improvement in the 
domestic savings rate – and a no less important consequence: captured savings must be 
invested. As Table 7 suggests, whether it is forced or voluntary, the domestic savings 
rate has been increasing gradually throughout the 1990s. The region’s average savings 
rate for the period 1990-2003 was 18.3% and it is forecast to reach 19.5% in 2003. 
                                                 
14 This includes Argentina, which in 2001 – once the run on bank deposits had begun, eventually leading 
to the tragedy of 2002 – had deposits in the banking system of some US$82bn, equivalent to 25% of 
GDP. In 1990, Argentine deposits barely came to US$11bn. 
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Nevertheless, the region’s diversity remains clear, as far as savings is concerned. The 
most successful countries continue to be those with the highest savings rates. 
 
Table 7. Domestic Savings Rates (% of GDP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Average
1990-2003
       
Argentina 17.2 14.3 14.2 15.6 15.6 15.9 18.9 20.6 21.1 19.1 17.9 15.8 11.1 12.1 16.4
Brazil 19.1 17.3 22.4 21.3 20.5 18.0 18.5 19.2 19.1 18.7 19.1 19.6 21.1 21.6 19.7
Chile 21.5 19.6 20.1 19.2 20.2 21.8 26.4 27.1 26.1 21.1 21.0 21.0 21.7 22.3 22.1
Colombia 18.0 20.3 17.6 14.7 18.7 17.4 21.6 20.2 19.0 13.3 12.6 14.2 14.4 14.4 16.9
Mexico 16.0 15.1 14.0 12.8 12.3 15.6 17.9 19.5 20.9 21.2 21.4 19.6 21.4 22.8 17.9
Peru 11.2 12.2 10.7 11.7 15.5 16.4 22.5 23.8 23.5 21.7 20.1 18.2 21.0 23.3 18.0
Uruguay 14.1 13.8 14.1 13.1 12.0 12.4 14.0 14.4 15.2 14.5 13.2 12.1 12.7 13.2 13.5
Venezuela 31.2 21.4 15.2 16.7 22.0 19.1 15.8 18.7 19.0 15.7 14.2 16.4 14.0 13.2 18.0
       
Simple Average 18.5 16.6 17.5 16.7 17.2 17.1 17.3 16.9 15.9 16.0 15.9 14.7 15.8 15.8 15.8
Weighted Average 18.4 16.7 17.5 16.8 17.3 17.1 18.9 20.0 20.2 18.8 18.6 18.3 18.8 19.5 18.3
Dispersion 6.0 3.4 3.8 3.3 3.8 2.8 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.6 4.8 5.5 5.5 5.5
Source: Author's own elaboration based on IFS data from the IMF (http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/). 
 
Given that domestic savings is nothing more than the sum of private and public savings, 
it is attractive in macroeconomic terms to identify what has happened to each 
economy’s public sector savings rate. The general assumption has been that the 1990s 
was a ‘decade of fiscal adjustment’ during which deficits were gradually reduced across 
the region. One of the implicit conclusions – at least a priori – is that such a reduction of 
public dissavings should have reduced the necessity to absorb private sector funds or, 
alternatively, substituted for foreign savings and therefore reduced the vulnerability of 
these economies to the kind of sudden stops of net capital inflows which frequently 
have ravaged the region.  
 
The hypothesis that the 1990s were ‘years of fiscal adjustment’ is undeniably correct. 
The region’s consolidated public deficit fell from 3.1% in 1990 to 2% in 2003, even 
despite negative developments in revenue collection which could have been expected 
from the region’s slow economic growth. Aside from Venezuela, which continues to 
generate deficits above 4% of GDP, there remain no countries in Latin America 
employing expansive fiscal policies. The degree of this adjustment is even more 
significant if we analyse the development of the region’s primary surplus which has 
increased from 1.7% of GDP in 1999 to 2.8% of GDP in 2003. 15 Brazil, Colombia, 
México and Argentina will all finish 2003 with primary surpluses above 2.5% of GDP. 
 
The difference between primary surpluses and consolidated public deficits is the amount 
of interest paid on accumulated public debt. The cost of such debt service in the region 
is on average some 4% of GDP (see Graph 3). Brazil and Colombia carry a debt 
servicing burden of even more than 5% of GDP. Except in the cases of Brazil and 
Argentina, public debt is not exorbitantly high by international standards, but it is 
certainly high enough to generate fears among domestic and international investors, a 
factor which expresses itself in the high yields they demand in order to acquire 
government paper. 
                                                 
15 Defined as the consolidated deficit minus payment of interest on public debt. 
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The big change has been that the region has been able to developed organized markets 
which permit – except in the case of Argentina – growing portions of public debt to be 
finance with domestic resources and, as a result, issued in paper denominated in local 
currency. 16 In other words, the reduction of public deficits and the creation of primary 
surpluses have served fundamentally to replace foreign financing with domestic private 
savings. The consequences of such an economic policy on the financing of growth will 
be analysed in the section dealing with the region’s ‘seventh deadly sin’: the low level 
of long-term private sector financing in local currency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Typically, local currency issues are linked to a variable interest rate and, to protect investors, they are 
also often indexed to market interest rates, the inflation rate or to a portion of local currency depreciation. 
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Graph 4 compares the situation in 1999 with that estimated for the end of 2003. In a 
very short time, the percentage of public debt denominated in local currency has 
increased from 50% to 66% of the total stock – or, expressed in different terms, from 
one in every two dollars of debt to two of every three dollars of total debt stock.17
 
Among the many conclusions that one might draw from such a phenomenal 
transformation, one of the most relevant is quite simple: the incentives which Latin 
American governments have for declaring debt default are increasingly small. This is 
because a growing portion of public sector liabilities are held by domestic investors – 
along with domestic banks and other institutional investors. Therefore, any potential 
public debt restructuring implies a much higher domestic ‘wealth effect’ than was 
previously the case, when public debt was basically external. Furthermore, the 
experience of countries which have declared default in the past (and, above all, the still 
unfolding experience of Argentina) has made clear the high economic and political costs 
which a country’s citizens must bear when the state unilaterally breaches its contractual 
commitments. In Latin American, as elsewhere, one extracts the convenient lessons of 
history.  
 
Although the only solid guarantee that the region has left behind the experience of debt 
default would be the maintenance of sustainable financial policies over the long run – 
and specifically, to achieve growth rates significantly higher that the interest rates 
charged on public debt, an achievement which, combined with the maintenance of 
primary surpluses over the medium run at current levels, would mathematically produce 
a dramatic reduction in the ratio of public debt to GDP – the dynamics of public debt 
appear today to be much less likely to generate the kind of shocks which in the past 
have destabilised confidence. Things have changed and for the better.  
 
                                                 
17 In Brazil, it is four out of every five dollars of debt, which perhaps explains why Lula’s government has 
two macroeconomic policy objectives: the ratio of debt to GDP and the inflation rate.  
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Can one therefore conclude that Latin American has fully redeemed itself with respect 
to its fourth deadly sin? 
 
Not completely. First, there are still countries – like Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia and 
Venezuela – with quite low domestic savings rates. Second, nearly all the region’s 
economies still must demonstrate that they are willing to put into place tax systems 
capable of revenue generation with minimal distortions in the allocation of resources. 
Finally, Latin American governments must demonstrate that policies designed to control 
social spending and investment in physical and human capital do not simply result in 
structural reductions in the long-term potential output of their economies.  
 
But even if absolution can not be complete, it would only be just to recognise that Chile, 
Brazil and Mexico have achieved a significant step forward. For more than a decade 
now, Chile has been committed to healthy public finances, while in Mexico and Brazil – 
the country whose public finances and debt dynamics raise the most serious doubts – 
citizens with savings capacity have become ‘Ricardians’, compensating for public 
sector dissaving with their own higher private sector savings rates, and channelling such 
savings to public paper denominated in local currency. This trend has reduced the public 
sector’s external vulnerability and generated an important long-term externality: the 
creation of deep, organised markets which can be used to finance long-term ‘productive 
investment’ as soon as the current crowding out of private credit – which inevitably 
results from public borrowing – has receded.  
 
Dependence on External Savings and Low Degrees of Economic Openness 
The region’s second macroeconomic deadly sin – largely a consequence of the first – is 
it high degree of dependency on external savings and, as a result, its tendency to 
accumulate foreign liabilities. 
 
On the face of it, there is not much to criticize in this vulnerability: indeed, Latin 
America depends on capital inflows in order to grow at rates which allow the regions to 
augment its physical and human resources and to improve its institutional architecture. 
Such a dependency is not at all unusual in a globalized economy and should not 
necessarily be considered a liability. Since 1971 the US economy has depended on 
external savings in order to continue growing at rapid rates. Spain, too, has been 
characterized by this dependency during much of its contemporary economic history. 
 
However, the big difference between the US and Spanish experiences, on the one hand, 
and the reality of Latin America, on the other, has been that the former could be 
reasonably confident that such inflows of external funds would remain stable,18 while in 
Latin America capital inflows have often slowed down abruptly – sometimes for 
endogenous reasons, sometimes due to exogenous factors – or even transformed into net 
outflows, forcing the economies in question to engage in painful adjustments in their 
levels of domestic absorption (spending) and their relative price structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Sometimes erroneously, as in the case of Spain – and other countries of pre-euro Europe – during the 
EMS crisis of 1992-93. 
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Table 8. Reliance on External Savings During the 1990s 
 Average 1990-1999 Structure of Capital Inflows (US$ bn) Structure of Capital Inflows (%) 
 US$ bn % GDP* FDI Mercados FMI FDI Mercados FMI 
         
Argentina 10.49 2.5% 5.5 4.61 0.38 52% 44% 4% 
Brazil 16.64 1.8% 9.5 3.18 3.97 57% 19% 24% 
Chile 3.11 3.4% 1.93 1.46 -0.29 62% 38%  
Colombia 2.65 2.3% 1.52 1.12 0 58% 42%  
Mexico 17.55 4.2% 8.3 7.34 1.92 47% 42% 11% 
Peru 2.96 5.4% 1.51 0.5 0.96 51% 17% 32% 
Uruguay 0.21 1.1% 0.11 0.11 -0.01 51% 49%  
Venezuela -0.19 -3.6% 1.69 -1.882 0 100%   
         
Regional Total 53.4 2.6% 30.06 16.42 6.93 56% 31% 13% 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IFS data from the IMF.  http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/   
 
Table 8 reveals the intensity of Latin America’s dependence on external savings during 
the 1990s. On average, the region attracted US$53.5bn annually in net capital inflows, 
underlining the use the Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile have made of external 
savings.19 Particularly interesting is the central role that FDI had in the region during 
this decade. Graph 5 presents a surprising picture for those still dominated by the idea 
that the region remains stuck in an increasingly intense external debt trap: the value of 
the region’s external financial debt has remained static since 1999 while direct 
investment has taken on a central role – as suggested by Table 8. The mere 
accumulation of annual flows during the decade brings the stock of direct investment to 
around US$500bn, the equivalent of some two-thirds of the continent’s external 
financial debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Gross capital inflows were even larger given the fact that many of these countries partially rolled over 
their external debt and made further investment abroad in the form of both FDI and portfolio investment. 
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Graph V. Capital Inflows in Latin America 
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There are many ways by which to interpret the region’s structural transformation. Some 
focus on the link between FDI inflows and the region’s privatization processes, and 
typically conclude that this was, by its very nature, a transient phenomenon given that, 
once the bulk of state assets have been sold off, the inflow of FDI will inevitably fall 
off.20 Others focus on the positive impact on productivity that should derive from the 
significant investments undertaken in key economic sectors – like telecommunications, 
energy and water infrastructure, other public services and financial systems -- and claim 
that the region has discovered in FDI a short-cut to higher levels of efficiency and 
productivity that will manifest itself in increases in potential growth rates over the 
medium run. Still others warn that FDI has gradually concentrated in the two largest 
economies, and in Chile, and that in the wake of the Argentine crisis this tendency will 
only strengthen,  making the debate over the future of FDI in the rest of the countries of 
the region somewhat academic.  
 
Even allowing for the caution demanded by the ever-sensitive situation in Argentina, 
the most plausible hypothesis would be that, should the governments of the region 
prove capable of persuading the investment community that they are truly ready to 
respect property rights, play by the rules of the game and, above all, achieve a deeper 
and more orderly integration of their markets with the world economy – as they most 
                                                 
20 Obviously, this has not been the case in all countries – Mexico and Brazil have maintained important 
public sector firms – and all sectors – energy and media remain off limits, by and large, to foreign 
investment. 
 18
certainly will attempt to do --  there exists more than a small possibility that we will 
witness a ‘second wave’ of FDI linked to these economies’ tradable goods sectors. 
From this perspective, the debate over the most appropriate model of regional trade 
integration – NAFTA, FTAA, EU-MERCOSUR, etc.– becomes one of the utmost 
importance for the future of capital flows to Latin America.  
 
Irrespective of these hypotheses about the future, the recent past offers clear evidence of 
the crucial importance of both trade openness and the capacity to attract stable flows of 
FDI. As has been the case on so many other occasions in the region’s history, since the 
outbreak of the emerging market crises in Asia during the summer of 1997 and, 
particularly, since the Russian ‘default’ in August 1998, the risk appetite of the 
international financial community has shrunk significantly. Table 9 details this collapse 
in net capital inflows suffered by nearly all of the region’s economies (the notable 
exception being Mexico, which received 18% more net capital inflows in 2002 than in 
1998). The intensity of this sudden stop of net capital inflows is encapsulated in a single 
figure: in three years, Latin America has experienced a reduction of net capital inflows 
of 91%, with certain countries like Argentina shifting from a recipient status to a ‘net 
exporter of capital’. 
 
Table 9. External Debt and Net Transfers of Resources 
 External Debt* Net Capital Inflows  
Virulence Sudden 
Stop 1999-2002
  US$bn % GDP 
% 
Exports
Debt 
Serviceªª 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
% 02 
vs 98 
% X 
1998 
% M 
1998 
              
Argentinaª 147 135.5% 5.5 70% 18.0 13.1 8.4 -7.6 -14.0  
-
178% 137% 52% 
Brazil 229 50.7% 3.9 77% 25.4 17.5 22.0 26.5 7.3  -71% 38% 36% 
Chile 38 60.8% 2.1 39% 1.7 -0.8 1.1 0.6 0.8  -56% 6% -6% 
Colombia 40 49.5% 3.2 68% 3.8 -0.8 0.4 2.8 1.2  -68% 22% -8% 
Mexico 167 26.5% 1.1 23% 18.2 14.6 21.0 25.3 21.1  16% -2% 10% 
Peru 28 50.8% 4.0 22% 2.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.9  -17% 7% 17% 
Uruguay 6 48.4% 2.5           
Venezuela 32 36.0% 1.0 14% 0.3 -2.5 -7.2 -6.0 -12.0  na na na 
              
Region 688 46.1% 2.9 51% 69.9 42.2 47.2 43.1 6.4  
-
50.5% 30.2% 20.4%
              
Debt Payments     83 108 109 101 86     
              
Recourse to 
Gross External 
Debt     153 150 156 144 93     
% GDP     8.3% 9.3% 8.7% 8.3% 6.3%     
              
Data on external debt from 2002             
a. Argentine data from 2001              
aa. Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and principal payments divided by exports of 
goods and services    
Source: Strictly Macro, Santander Investment (July 2003) and author’s own elaboration based on 
IFS data from the IMF.  http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/        
 
To confront a situation like this in the short run is not possible except at a very high 
price. The table attempts to transmit an idea of the ‘effort undertaken’ in order to adapt 
to the new environment, calculating the percentage which exports would have to 
increase (30%) or imports fall (20%) so as to substitute with income or savings of 
foreign exchange the evaporation of international finance. In the case of Brazil, an 
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economy whose degree of openness (imports/GDP) is some 11%, in order to substitute 
for the 2% of GDP which on average Brazil received in annual external financing would 
require something of a 20% reduction of imports. Whatever might be Brazil’s import 
elasticity in relation to GDP or the real exchange rate, to affect an adjustment of this 
magnitude in the short run would require a brutal contraction of domestic absorption 
and an intense adjustment in the country’s structure of relative prices. In other words, 
from the moment investors lost confidence in the country – and began to withdraw their 
money – a Brazilian recession and a collapse of the Real’s exchange rate became 
inevitable. The Argentine case was even more difficult given that the policy of 
convertibility blocked any adjustment in the nominal (one-to-one) exchange rate upon 
which the government had attempted to construct the growth and stability of the 
economy. 
 
These calculations have been validated by recent experience. At the high point of capital 
inflows in 1997, the region was experiencing a US$5bn trade deficit, compared with a  
surplus of some US$38bn last year. This turnaround was not at all due to exports (which 
were severely limited by slow world growth and depressed raw material prices) but 
rather almost exclusively to the universal collapse in the region’s imports. Excluding 
Mexico from the figures (while this country alone accounts for about half of the 
region’s international trade, it has not been affected by the ‘sudden stop’ of capital 
inflows), regional exports in dollar terms increased by 6% between 1999 and 2002, 
while imports fell 4% on average. 
 
Argentina’s imports collapsed to levels not seen in two decades – to US$9bn, from 
US$25bn only two years earlier – while in Brazil imports fell 16% in dollar terms in a 
single year. Even though the nominal exchange rate devaluations were quite severe – 
46% on average for the region and 32% excluding Argentina – the required fall in 
domestic absorption was very significant. Taking 1996 as the base year, the cumulative 
growth in domestic demand (consumption plus investment) by the end of last year was 
negative 17% in Argentina, 0% in Colombia and Venezuela, around 7% in Peru and 
Brazil, while only two countries – Chile and, above all, Mexico – proved capable of 
registering ‘decent’ growth: 13% in Chile and 33% in Mexico. In other words, four 
years of declining capital inflows have translated into stagnation of the spending of 75% 
of the inhabitants of the region.21
 
The table’s left-hand columns present another dimension of the problem. The region not 
only needs capital ‘flows’ to grow; it also needs them in order to deal with its ‘stock’ 
problems: the region’s  high level of indebtedness – US$700bn – necessitates that some 
50% of annual export earnings be dedicated to servicing interest payments or paying off 
principle. Put in another way, when capital inflows dry up, the percentage of principal 
payments which need to be ‘rolled over’ must increase for the region to continue to 
honour its external debt. If more ‘roll overs’ are not arranged, the risk of default 
increases exponentially. This vulnerability – common to most developing and emerging 
economies – is very real for Latin America. 
 
The lower portion of the table emphasizes another question of equal importance. When 
debt is rolled over, it is not always renewed by the original creditor. On occasion, 
certain creditors (typically financial creditors) will locate financiers willing to substitute 
                                                 
21 Mexico accounts for 75% of the growth in private consumption in Latin America during the period 
1997-2002 and for 130% of the increase in the region’s gross capital formation. 
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for them as resource conduits to countries in crisis. Thus, while the ‘markets’ still met 
some 46% of the region’s need for gross external savings in 1998, by 2002 they were 
contributing a mere 7% of the region’s gross capital inflows.22  In 2002 the IMF was 
forced to stump up two of every three dollars of gross capital inflows into the region in 
order to mitigate ‘systemic risk,’ although this cost the Fund dearly in terms of its 
reputation. The IMF’s supposed role as leader and arbiter of the international financial 
situation was consequently picked up by the ratings agencies, while the Fund was 
ferociously attacked by all those who believe that the risks stemming for such ‘moral 
hazard’ – the development of a habit of designing financial aid packages to ‘bail out’ 
countries which persist in erroneous macroeconomic policies, thus contributing to future 
crises – would be far worse than even a severe regional recession. 
 
The rest of the external savings requirement was picked up by direct investment. 
Analyzing the stability of the contribution coming from FDI – some 33% of gross 
financing requirements and, in terms of flows (as seen in Table 8), some 60% of the 
registered current account deficits – one can conclude that, apart from the positive 
externalities in terms of the efficiency and productivity generated by direct investments 
over the past decade, there has already by one concrete, tangible result: FDI has become 
the region’s  most predictable and stable source of external financing. Without the 
US$38bn in FDI that entered the region in 2002, the level of net capital inflows would 
not have been compatible with the maintenance of stability, regardless of how much the 
IMF and other multilateral institutions could have possibly contributed. 
 
The eruption of FDI onto the Latin American financial scene raises some serious 
questions concerning the design of the international financial architecture. During the 
‘lost decade,’ for example, when a ‘problematic’ country bent over backwards to do 
everything in its power to demonstrate sufficient respect for contracts and property 
rights (by paying its debt, for example, even if with reductions in its net present value), 
it was reasonable to expect that the principal preoccupation of the IMF would be how 
such a country could secure the highest possible sustainable primary surplus so as to 
service new commitments, while the major worry of governments was how to reconcile 
the efforts required to achieve this surplus with the survival of some ‘light at the end of 
the tunnel’ – that is to say, with economic growth and social improvements, once the 
adjustment had been made. 
 
In the new context, however, the situation has become much more complex. On the one 
hand, there are more ‘property rights’ to respect: those of bondholders, those of the 
adjudicated parties in privatizations or concession agreements, those of direct investors 
and, or course, those of the local citizens, increasingly well-versed in how to use the 
democratic system to protect their individual and collective interests. To attempt to 
focus all intellectual and political energy on the special defence of just one of these 
groups would be doomed to failure from the start.23 When problems emerge, 
multilateral negotiation and an equal distribution of the resulting burdens is the only 
realistic approach. This means that all of those who have decided to become long-term 
                                                 
22 If we exclude Mexico, gross capital inflows channelled into the region by the ‘markets’ were actually 
negative, to the tune of US$15bn.  
23 As, for example, when the IMF, at the outbreak of the Argentine crisis and for much of 2002, insisted 
on making its project to create an international mechanism for resolving debt crises (SDRM) the central 
item on its international agenda. 
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partners of the country in question must feel a ‘sense of ownership’ toward the 
adjustment program needed to resolve the problem. 
 
In practice – and Argentina will be a good test case for this – ‘heterodox’ solutions of 
the kind occasionally used in the past will be much more difficult to employ and 
maintain over time as a result. On the other hand, if all goes well and the situation in 
Argentina is resolved favourably, FDI could help moderate the volatility of the region’s 
cycles.24 The dynamic consistency and quality of economic policy will increasingly 
become the preferred object of attention for foreign direct investors. It is indeed difficult 
to imagine that voluntarism will ever again be able to take the place of a rational 
analysis of what can or cannot be realistically done with economic policy. 
 
The conclusions of the above analysis of the region’s dependence on external savings 
are more balanced than the broad brushstroke vision that is typically wielded in such 
discussions. Given its level of development, Latin America naturally needs to rely on 
foreign savings – at least according to traditional economic theory – in order to 
complement its domestic savings. If growth does not accelerate as a result, at least the 
region would be able to continue to service the external debt which it has accumulated 
over the years and which during the 1990s began to give way to large inflows of FDI. 
Although it is clear that FDI also produces a transfer of resources abroad – in the form 
of repatriation of dividends or surplus capital – the long-term ‘strategic alliance’ implied 
by FDI has the potential to mitigate one of the most worrying characteristics of the 
region: susceptibility to ‘sudden stops’ of capital inflows. 
 
Doubts concerning the region’s capacity to attract sufficient funds in the current context 
(post-Argentina 2002) have quickly given way to concerns as to how ‘Policy’ – with all 
its implications for the institutional framework and international agreements, might 
contribute to making heightened certainty regarding the stability and transparency of the 
rules of the game, and increased trade openness and access to global markets the key 
levers for producing a ‘second wave’ of FDI in the region which – as occurred in the 
Spanish case – might serve as a new stimulus for greater economic interdependence 
between the economies of Latin America and the rest of the world. 
 
The economies which have exhibited the best practices in the region – Mexico, Brazil 
and Chile – are also the best positioned – due to the size of their markets, their 
advantages in terms of institutional stability, or their particular international trade 
agreements -- with respect to this new kind of agenda.  
 
Low Levels of Investment in Physical and Human Capital 
One does not need to be a fanatical disciple of the Harrod-Domar model to come to the 
conclusion that an increase in the growth rate must be preceded by – in addition to solid 
policies and institutions – investment which expands and deepens an economy’s stock 
of physical capital.  
 
Although it would be difficult – and risky – to make a summary judgement as to the 
long-term potential growth rate based solely upon the rate of investment in terms of 
                                                 
24 This would imply that fair compensation payments be made to foreign direct investors for property 
damage deriving from administrative and judicial decisions, that agreements are reached on norms for 
guaranteeing the maintenance of business activity, and that negotiations on the outstanding defaulted debt 
are begun. 
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GDP, one could say that – to paraphrase Oscar Wilde – only a macroeconomic snob 
would try to evade the most obvious facts and argue that low growth rates do not 
necessarily derive from low rates of investment. 
 
As can be seen in Graph 6, the region’s average investment rate (in terms of GDP) 
during the 1990s was 18.8%, falling one point during 1997-2002 and finally settling at 
16.7% in 2003. This has implied that given an already low investment rate – one, in 
fact, more typical of developed than emerging economies – the external constraint 
which has been evident during the most recent years has been even more costly than it 
might have been. 
 
Graph VI. Investment/GDP
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The investment rate has fallen in all the countries of the region, while in some – 
Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay – there has been marked collapse. One could 
probably risk the claim that in all the region’s economies the sustainability of a lasting 
economic recovery depends critically on the possibility that these investment rates begin 
to rise once again above 18% of GDP. At the opposite end of the spectrum we find 
Chile – the region’s investment leader, with an average investment rate of 23% during 
1990-2002 and economic growth above 6% on average – along with Peru and Mexico 
(even despite the Tequila Crisis of 1994-95 and the absence of significant private bank. 
Investment in Brazil has also been above the regional average, even if its investment 
rates have reflected the difficulties the Brazilian economy has faced since 1999 and the 
high interest characteristic of its recent growth model. 
 
While investment in human capital is more difficult to measure, it probably has an even 
greater impact upon potential growth than the mere augmentation of the capital stock or 
the incorporation of new technologies to the productive process. An entire branch of 
growth theory (ie, the endogenous growth models) in one way or another rests upon 
some type of measurement of investment in education and culture as an explanation of 
the differing evolution of countries in the process of development. Among all the 
possible measurements, we have chosen to depict in Table 10 certain indicators which 
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compare the basic characteristics of primary and secondary education systems both 
within the region and against certain international references. The figures come from the 
exemplary data base of Robert Barro as well as from the countries themselves. 
 
Table 10. Investment in Human Capital 
 Public Spending/Student, $US 1985 PPP  Teacher Salaries Failure Rate 
 Primary Secondary Primary   
 1960 1990 
% 
Income 1960 1990 
% 
Income US $ 
% 
Income 1970 1990 
Argentina       2,997 77 36.3 34.3 
Brazil  364       78 80 
Chile 185 356 8.2 476 326 7.5   22.7 23 
Colombia 153 210 6.4 442 329 10.0 8,081 279 43 44 
Mexico 128 200 3.4 264 476 8.2 3,817 72 11.1 28 
Peru 122   370   3,056 123 34.2 29.8 
Uruguay  395 8.6  416 9.0 4,270 114 14 7 
Venezuela 276 149 2.5 1018 478 7.9 7,954 132 40.5 52 
           
Regional Average 173 279 5.8 514 405 8.5 5,029.2 132.8 35.0 37.3 
           
United States 1,079 2,721 15.1 1255 4,181 23.1 24,728 149 11 11 
Spain 100 1,154 12.0 177 1,322 13.8 17,937 238 2 3 
Sweden  7,003 47.5   2,834 19.2 50,498 379 0 0 
           
World Average 235 961 12.9 696 1,171 24.3 13,087.8 314.6 29.2 24.9 
Source: Barro-Lee Data Set: International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality 
 
Referring to the data, as opposed to preconceptions, one must agree with Getulio Vargas 
when he said that ‘finding the truth is not difficult. The complications begin when one 
decides to live with it.’ The fact of the matter is that the level of spending on education 
is above that of economies with levels of development far superior to that of the region. 
 
Possibly as a result of the republican spirit which animated the ‘construction’ of many 
Latin America nations during the first half of last century, the national efforts dedicated 
to education in these countries has been notable. Brazil, for example, has 74% of the 
youth population enrolled in school,25 while Mexico is providing secondary education 
to 30% of the population. Spending on education in national budgets varies between 3% 
of total public expenditures in Peru and the 5.3% registered by Mexico. Despite this, the 
numbers of Barro and Lee – Table 10 – moderate the enthusiasm that might come from 
the budget data. Public spending on education in the region – which in 1960 was higher 
than in Spain and 70% of a simple international average – today barely accounts for a 
third of the average in the rest of the world, while the percentages for school failure 
have increased to the point where they are now worryingly high in Venezuela, 
Colombia and Brazil. All of this suggests that ‘education’ needs a second regional 
‘push’, even if only because it is the most potent weapon for improving social mobility 
and broadening the middle classes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In some countries, the school serves as a vehicle for broader social programmes. For example, in the 
case of Brazil, during the previous Administration an interesting education campaign was undertaken – 
‘the School Fund’ – offering incentives for youth to attend school in the form of a direct subsidy to their 
parents on the condition that they comply with the condition of regular attendance. In other cases, the 
school forms a central aspect of food programs, like Zero Hunger.  
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Low Level of Medium- and Long-term Finance in Local Currencies 
In addition to the problems of institutional instability and macroeconomic volatility, the 
relatively low rates of investment registered in the region are typically attributed to the 
difficulties faced by households and businesses in securing medium- and long-term 
financing at reasonable prices and in local currency. Indeed, in addition to the 
supposedly weak intermediation capacity of the banking system and the lack of deep 
and efficient capital markets, another familiar characteristic in the literature on the roots 
of underdevelopment – and which to a certain degree is the inevitable corollary of many 
of the vulnerabilities which have been analysed above – is a kind of reticence with 
respect to the allowing the Judicial system to enforce the rules, honour contracts, and 
effectively defend property rights over and above the priority objectives of income 
redistribution, improving low domestic savings, moderating macroeconomic volatility 
and dealing with the stark discontinuities in the growth process. 
 
This ‘sin’ is reasonably clear. Table 11 tracks the development of domestic credit as a 
proportion of GDP from the early 1980s. From the table one can verify that, in line with 
the low levels of deposits/GDP analyzed in Section V, the level of credit to GDP is also 
low overall: barely 40%. 
 
But it is also clear that this percentage is growing: in 2002 it was double that registered 
in 1980. The problem is that the lever which is increasing the level of bank asset 
intermediation has been a rise in banks’ exposure to the public sector. On average, 
credit to the public sector was some 17% of GDP across the region in 2002, while two 
decades ago it was only 6%. In other words, more than three-fourths of the deepening 
bank intermediation within the region can be explained by the demand for credit from 
national public sectors. This is actually the opposite side of the coin which we raised 
above in our discussion of the level of domestic savings: more than ever before the 
region is substituting foreign for domestic savings and a large part of these savings has 
gone to finance regional public sectors. 
 
Table 11. Credit and Banking Systems  
Domestic Credit/GDP
Credit to Public 
Sector/GDP
Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP
% Credit Public 
Sector/Total CreditCountries 
1981 1995 2002 1981 1995 2002 1981 1995 2002 1981 1995 2002 
                          
Argentina 26.1% 26.4% 49.5% 4.4% 8.2% 34.3% 21.7% 19.7% 15.1% 16.8% 31.2% 69.4% 
Brazil 18.4% 63.1% 45.9% 5.8% 8.7% 16.7% 12.6% 32.6% 29.2% 31.3% 13.8% 36.3% 
Chile 39.0% 49.7% 64.1% 0.7% 0.7% 1.1% 38.3% 51.9% 63.0% 1.7% 1.4% 1.7% 
Colombia 15.0% 18.9% 28.6% 1.1% 2.3% 8.6% 14.0% 18.0% 20.0% 7.0% 12.3% 30.1% 
Mexicoª 18.8% 30.0% 31.2% 1.4% 4.8% 20.8% 15.6% 25.2% 10.4% 7.4% 16.0% 66.7% 
Venezuela 28.2% 15.9% 14.3% 0.9% 7.5% 4.2% 27.3% 8.7% 10.1% 3.2% 47.2% 29.5% 
             
Region 21.3% 40.9% 39.2% 3.2% 6.3% 17.1% 17.6% 27.2% 22.1% 14.9% 15.5% 43.6% 
a. Mexico includes IPAB Notes           
Source: International Financial Statistics IMF. Bank 
Deposits Series. http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/        
 
While the data on credit/GDP suggest that the ‘crowding out’ has not been complete, it 
appears highly probably that the public financing demand has affected the price of 
credit, the length of loans and the type of borrowers that the banking sector has been 
able to finance in the various national private sectors. An easy yet powerful way to 
demonstrate this phenomenon would be to point out that between 1995 and 2002 115% 
of the increase in deposits held by the region’s financial systems funded loans to the 
region’s public sectors. This has obviously necessitated the development of alternative 
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markets and instruments for the provision of liquidity which was accommodated by the 
growth in the region’s banking systems. 
 
The heterogeneous nature of the region is even greater – if that is possible – with regard 
to this vulnerability. As can been seen in Table 11, Chile has managed to find efficient 
financing mechanisms for its otherwise disciplined public sector and has based the 
increase of its banking intermediation on the expansion of finance granted to the private 
sector. By far Chile is the Latin American country with the most significant degree of – 
and most balanced – banking intermediation. In second place comes Brazil, with a ratio 
of credit to the private sector around 30%, nearly double the level experienced at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Although the weight of public credit has increased in these 
years, only half of the increase in bank intermediation can be explained by the 
augmented exposure by banks to sovereign risk. Finally there is the case of Mexico, 
which continues to pay for the residues of its banking crisis during the 1990s. The 
percentage of credit extended to the private sector is now at an historic low, while the 
paper issued to facilitate the transition to a normalized banking system – the IPAB notes 
– continues to distort the potential growth of a system which has been radically 
transformed in recent years. The opposite of such situations can be found recently in 
Argentina – where the banking system will have to be restructured – and in Venezuela, 
a country where the financial system has seen its size and involvement in the economy 
reduced. 
 
Reviewing: Who Sins and How Much Does it Matter? 
The central idea of this paper is that Latin America is a heterogeneous region formed of 
countries which, while sharing reasonably similar vulnerabilities, with the passage of 
time have proved capable of finding differentiated solutions which have mitigated – or 
aggravated – the importance of such factors in their recent growth paths. 
 
Graph VII: Latin America’s Mortal Sins 
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While to synthesize all of the above analysis into a ‘regional standings of sinners’ 
would obviously be an overwhelming simplification, this is exactly the objective of 
Graph 7.26 Here we can clearly see that Chile is the ‘smallest sinner’ of the region, 
followed by Uruguay, Peru, Brazil and Mexico. Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela, in 
that order, finish off the ranking. As we can see, a ranking of these countries according 
to social indicators – including the quality of institutions, the level of perceived 
corruption, and the distribution of income – would be slightly different from that which 
classified these same countries by their macroeconomic vulnerabilities – domestic 
savings rate, dependence on external finance, investment in human and physical capital, 
and the level of credit extended to the private sector as a percentage of GDP – or from 
that given by the synthetic index which aggregates all of the factors under consideration. 
Concretely, Uruguay and Peru base their relative strengths on ‘social indicators’ and as 
a result move up in position within the global ranking, while on the contrary Brazil and 
Colombia see their macroeconomic advantages undermined by their social ‘weaknesses’ 
– income distribution in the former and political instability and violence in the alter – 
pulling both countries down within the synthetic ranking. 
 
Graph VIII. Growth, Volatility and the Global Index 
(1990-2000) 
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26 The problems involved in aggregation have been resolved in a convenient way: for each of the ‘sins’ 
the eight countries have been ordered according to the analyzed indicator, with the most vulnerable 
country occupying the first position and the least vulnerable occupying the eighth position. The aggregate 
indicator is the sum of the position occupied with respect to each of the ‘sins’ by each country, such that 
the country which obtains the most points is the country least vulnerable overall, and the country which 
receives the least number of points is the most vulnerable. To incorporate the differences among the 
positions occupied an estimated deviation from the regional average for each country has been used for 
each of the vulnerabilities. Normalizing these deviations with the help of the variance in each series 
allows one to obtain the global index which, obviously, is identical to the ranking presented in Graph 8. 
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This situation makes the result illustrated in Graph 8 very predictable: the adjustment of 
growth patterns to the values comprising the Synthetic Index of Vulnerabilities is only 
moderately satisfactory27, while the correlation between the values of the index and the 
volatility registered for each percentage point of growth is also not that high (57%)28. 
But there is at least some ‘smoke and mirrors’ in this explanatory capacity of Latin 
America’s ‘sins’: it would be enough to simply eliminate Chile from the sample for the 
volatility and the average growth rate to become independent of the values incorporated 
into index. In other words, the list of ‘sins’ only explains the behaviour of the country 
which, in the opinion of the international community, has been able to take off from the 
rest of the region and begin to leave it behind: Chile. For the rest of the countries in 
question, the correlation is either very low or statistically insignificant. 
 
Clearly this does not mean that good institutions, high savings rates, and efficient and 
profitable financial systems are irrelevant to growth rates and volatility. On the contrary, 
what really emerges from the data is that – excepting Chile, a country which has 
followed the textbook on growth –the other countries of the region have attempted to 
                                                 
27 As demonstrated by the adjustment equation, the index only explains 66% of growth. It is also 
immediately clear that if we exclude Chile from the simple, the explanatory capacity of the ‘sins’ on 
growth between 1990 and 2000 simply collapses (to less than 10%), revealing a completely new situation 
in which the observed growth pattern is inelastic with respect to the values of the Index.  
28 One possible explanation of this failure is that the synthetic index is merely a static and arbitrary 
representation of Latin American reality. Nevertheless, while it is true that our indicator has been 
constructed upon what could fairly be called heroic assumptions, it is comforting to know that other 
authors arrive – if by different paths – at basically the same regional classifications. The most recent 
version of The Economic Freedom Index (2002), elaborated by the Fraser and Cato Institutes from more 
than 38 integrated indicators in 5 broad thematic groupings, presents the very same countries in its first 
three positions. Among the rest of the countries, their ranking differs from ours only in that it fails to 
capture the effects of the Argentine crisis of 2002 and still situates the economic freedoms of Argentina at 
a higher level than those of Mexico or Brazil. Furthermore, the IMD’s 2003 World Competitiveness 
Report also ranks Latin American economies more or less in the same way, with Chile leading the region, 
followed by Colombia, Brazil, México, Argentina and Venezuela. 
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find ‘shortcuts’ to growth in the past. Sometimes they have found such ‘shortcuts,’ but 
other times they have not. On such occasions all the progress of a decade has simply 
been swept away by steep recessions and dramatic instabilities. 
 
The consequences of the distinct paths to prosperity chosen by the countries of the 
region can be seen in Graph 9, which presents the growth in per capita income in 
constant dollars in both Chile and Argentina during the period 1970-2002. The 
differences are stark: while in Chile the growth in per capita income has been a 
continuous process, Argentina appears trapped in a kind of vicious cycle from which it 
continues to fight to free itself, even to this day. 
 
Optimism does come from the clear capacity of different countries to undertake reform. 
Chile has not always been the economy that it is today. In 1970, Chile was the country 
with the worst performance on the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, 
occupying the last position among 54 countries, while Venezuela was the regional 
leader in the 12th position, even ahead of Spain. Thirty years later, this picture has 
radically changed. Chile is now the regional leader, occupying the 20th position from 
among 152 countries – 15 positions ahead of Spain – while Venezuela has fallen back 
dramatically to position 103. There is no better proof that ‘change’ is possible, and the 
results are clear. Chile is today the Latin American country with the highest per capita 
income and which has least suffered the consequences of the loss of credibility in the 
region since the crisis of 1997. 
 
Graph IX. Per Capita Income in Contant US $ 1970-2003.  
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During the second half of the 1980s, Chile demonstrated that ‘change’ was possible and 
that therefore there is no Latin American curse. Other countries, including Brazil and 
Mexico, are attempting to follow the same ‘State Agenda’ and while the process has not 
yet been successfully concluded, there are clear signs that they have laid the essential 
macro foundations for their growth processes to become more stable and socially 
responsible than in the past. 
 
The region is better off than it was 20 years ago. There is no doubt about that. The 
problem is that the world has also ‘improved’ and what was ‘sufficient’ back then no 
longer is. In the global economy of the first decade of this century, Latin America 
encounters many more formidable competitors than in the past. Countries like China 
and other Emerging Asian economies, along with the enlarged European Union, are 
now competing with Latin America for external financing with which to accelerate their 
own growth rates. The region will have to adapt to this new challenge and must outline 
a new agenda of institutional transformation that is truly consistent with the objective of 
achieving sustainable growth without ignoring important social aspects of Latin 
American realities. It is in this terrain – that of social stability and legal security – where 
the most glaring international competitive weaknesses of the region are still to be found. 
 
Conclusions 
In the end, there is not much of a case for continuing to insist that Latin America’s 
‘damnation’ is the consequence of a fixed and unchanging list of original or deadly 
‘sins.’ The preconceptions shrouding the region must give way to more detached and 
subtle analyses capable of recognizing that important structural transformations over the 
course of the last decade have modified the nature and intensity of the region’s 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Today the region bears little resemblance to the Latin America of the mid-1980s, with 
its authoritarian governments besieged by hyperinflation, debilitating public deficits, 
external debt defaults, exchange rate problems and the dramatic intensification of 
poverty. Today Latin America is democratic, with inflation below 10%, primary budget 
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surpluses larger that those ever achieved in the EU during the euro convergence years, 
sustainable exchange rate regimes, and a renewed commitment to respect the rules of 
the game and to integrate into the international economy. 
 
The region might not yet be ‘perfect’, but it is better than it was 10 years ago. The rates 
of transformation have differed and the results are certainly not homogeneous. A look at 
the countries in the area inclines one to agree with Tolstoy: each Latin American nation 
is ‘unhappy’ in its own way, and in its own way it will have to resolve its permanently 
frustrated ambitions of seeing its economy finally taking off. 
 
Seneca once said that there are no favourable winds for those who do not now where 
they are going. To know the direction in which to go, to know what ambitions and 
objectives are feasible for a country, is the most difficult challenge facing leaders and 
societies in Latin America today, particularly in countries that have not been capable of 
convincing their citizens or the rest of the world that their project for nation is clear and 
feasible. 
 
Of all of Latin America’s ‘historic sins’ the most devastating has probably been the 
region’s immoderate tendency toward ‘foundational’ reforms, those which wipe away 
everything which existed or came before. Reforms which modify the rules, contracts or 
rights established in previous periods – obviously failed periods – of economic 
development. The price paid for such changes has been very high in the majority of 
cases. But the lesson has been learned. There are no institutional shortcuts or magic 
economic policies that by themselves guarantee success. Prosperity can only be 
guaranteed by the existence of a ‘State Agenda’ which is reasonable, well-balanced and 
accepted by a broad consensus. Above all, there must be persistence and continuity in 
the pursuit of such an agenda. One must stay the course. 
 
In his induction address, the current Brazilian Minister of Finance, Antonio Palloci, put 
it very clearly: 
 
‘Ministros da Fazenda nem sempre são portadores de boas novas. Nem são 
tampouco, obrigatória e inversamente, portadores de más notícias. Ministros da 
Fazenda são, por dever do ofício, forçados a trabalhar com o cálice nem sempre 
doce dos números e do realismo renitente, talvez até irritante para os mais 
apressados. Nações, entretanto, não são construídas apressadamente. Precisam 
de sólidos alicerces, de pedra sobre pedra, de estabilidade, de regras claras, de 
solidez institucional.’ 
 
Some countries in the region have already learned this. They make institutional 
continuity and the maintenance of a reform consensus their central objectives on the 
road to progress. Respect for the rule of law and previously acquired commitments is 
the best way to remain reliable. 
 
The others will continue on the same path on which sooner or later all of the region’s 
success stories have embarked. Each is their own way, but it is clear that they will do it, 
for the lesson has been learned. The only truly unforgivable regional ‘sin’ is to have so 
many times and for so long frustrated the expectations of Latin Americans for a better 
life. 
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